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Owens v. Gresham helped explain the term "guest" in
the South Carolina guest statute.2 Thomas Gresham entered
a filling station, leaving his car running and lights on, and
entered into a conversation with the appellant's decedent,
John B. Owens, Jr. Owens then left in the automobile with
Gresham and was shortly thereafter killed when the automo-
bile was hit by another vehicle. John B. Owens, Sr. brought
suit against Gresham in the name of his son's estate alleging
that Owens had been a ipassenger in Gresham's car. The trial
judge instructed the jury that the plaintiff could recover only
under the guest statute, which reads in part:
No person transported by an owner or operator of a motor vehicle as
his guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause
of action for damages against such motor vehicle or its owner or
operator for injury, death or loss in case of an accident unless such
accident shall have been intentional on the part of such owner or
operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard for the
rights of others.3
The supreme court held that this instruction was erroneous
and remanded the case. The court said that the limitation of
liability imposed by this statute applies only to a guest who
is transported without payment. Payment may be anything
of tangible benefit to the driver of the vehicle, i.e., payment
does not have to be monetary, it only need be some benefit
gained by the driver beside hospitality and companionship.
Thus, whether one is a guest or passenger usually depends
on the circumstances of each particular case.
In the case at hand, the court noted that, taking the evi-
dence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, an inference
could be drawn from the testimony that Owens went with
Gresham for Gresham's benefit.4 Thus, the status of the de-
cedent was a jury question and could not be determined as a
matter of law by the judge.
1. 258 S.C. 46, 186 S.E.2d 816 (1972).
2. S.C. CoDE ANN. §46-801 (Cu. Supp. 1972).
3. Id.
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The court also noted that if the jury decided that Owens
was, indeed, a passenger instead of a guest, Gresham owed
him the duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring him
as at common law.
The supreme court again dealt with the guest statute in
Berry v. Hall.; After visiting relatives the plaintiff and de-
fendant in defendant's car, returned to defendant's home for
plaintiff to pick up his car. As plaintiff was getting out of
the back seat of defendant's two-door car, the defendant put
the car in gear and began moving, so as not to block plaintiff's
car. This caused the plaintiff, Berry, to fall and injure him-
self, for which injuries he brought suit against Hall under
the guest statute.6
At the trial level the jury found for the plaintiff and
Hall appealed that verdict. The supreme court reversed and
remanded but only after agreeing in the most part with the
trial judge. The defendant claimed that a directed verdict
should have been handed down in his favor. The court dis-
agreed, saying that the question of heedlessness or reckless-
ness on the part of the defendant is ordinarily one for the
jury. The court also disagreed with the defendant's motion
on contributory negligence. In South Carolina contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff will not bar recovery
under the guest statute. Only contributory heedlessness and
recklessness on the part of the plaintiff will do this," and the
presence of contributory recklessness and heedlessness again
is a jury question.8
In this case there was enough evidence presented to draw
a reasonable inference either way regarding the actions of
the plaintiff or the defendant for the question to go to the
jury (as to the heedlessness or recklessness of the defendant
or contributory heedlessness or recklessness of the plaintiff).
However, the case was reversed on another issue. In his
instructions to the jury, the trial judge read Section 46-511, 9
5. 258 S.C. 63, 187 S.E.2d 242 (1972).
6. S.C. CODE ANN. §46-801 (Cu. Supp. 1972).
7. Powers v. Temple, 250 S.C. 149, 156 S.E.2d 759 (1967).
8. Ardis v. Griffin, 239 S.C. 529, 123 S.E.2d 876 (1962).
9. S.C. CoDE ANN. §46-511 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
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which deals with operating unsafe vehicles, and Section 46-
40110 which deals with starting stopped vehicles. Section
46-511 specifically states that it applies only to vehicles driven
on any highway and Section 46-401 when read in conjunction
with Section 46-28811 also applies only to vehicles being driven
on the public highway. The defendant claimed that since this
accident took place on private property, the reading of these
portions of S. C. Code was reversible error. The court agreed
and remanded the case, saying only that these portions do not
relate to vehicles operated on private property and the trial
judge was in error in instructing the jury by the use of these
sections.
In Jarvis v. Green2 the supreme court ruled on a finding
of negligence by the jury and its effect on punitive damages.
The plaintiff Viola Jarvis' automobile was struck in the rear
by the automobile of one Reeder after Reeder's car had been
struck in the rear by the defendant, Green. At the trial, the
judge directed a verdict against punitive damages and then
sent the question of negligence on Green's part to the jury.
The jury returned averdict for the plaintiff for actual dam-
ages and the plaintiff appealed, hoping for punitive damages
also. The court, Moss, C. J. reversed and remanded.
The court noted that the violation of the statute under
consideration 3 is ordinarily a jury question.' 4 Likewise, the
determination of the exercising of due care on the part of the
defendant is one for the jury. Thus, if the jury decided that
the defendant did not use reasonable care and that he violated
Section 46-393, it could find the defendant negligent per se,
i.e., in violation of statute and should consider evidence of
recklessness and willfulness on the issue of punitive damages.
Thus, the trial judge should have passed the question of puni-
tive damages to the jury where there was evidence of lack
of due care and negligence per se. His failure to do so was
reversible error.15
10. S.C. Con, ANN. §46-401 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. §46-288 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
12. 257 S.C. 558, 186 S.E.2d 765 (1972).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. §46-393 (Cum. Supp).
14. See, West v. Sowell 237 S.C. 641, 118 S.E2d 692 (1961).
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II. INTENTIONAL TORTS
A. Fraud
The supreme court dealt with the issue of fraud in Lundy
v. Palmetto State Life Insurance Co. 16 The defendant Palmetto
State Life Insurance Co., was charged with fraudulently de-
ceiving the plaintiff's testate into giving up life insurance
coverage which was rightfully hers. Della M. Reynolds, sister
of the plaintiff, worked at Myrtle Beach Air Force Base until
1967, at which time she retired. Upon leaving the base she
was told that she could convert her government life insurance
policies into policies with any one of several insurance com-
panies with no physical examination. On May 17, 1967, Fed-
eral Employees Group Life Insurance advised Miss Reynolds
that the right to convert her insurance would expire on June
1, 1967, and again that it would not be necessary for her to
take a physical to convert the insurance. The letter also listed
the names of several private companies who would convert
the policy, one of which was the defendant. From this point,
the testimony at the trial stage was very contradictory. The
plaintiff claimed that Miss Reynolds applied to the defendant
company to convert this insurance. Upon this application, the
plaintiff claimed, Oliver Hinson, an agent of defendant, re-
quired the decedent to undergo a physical examination and
after such examination turned down decedent's request for
conversion and returned payment. This action claimed the
plaintiff, was fraudulent and thus, the estate of Della M.
Reynolds was entitled to $6,000, the maximum amount of the
converted policy, upon Miss Reynold's death.
The defendant claimed that Miss Reynolds never applied
for this conversion but only for a new policy which could not
be issued because of her health. Upon a jury verdict for the
plaintiff, the defendant appealed on the issue of proof of
fraud. The supreme court reversed and remanded. The court
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16. 256 S.C. 506, 183 S.E.2d 335 (1971).
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e) his intent that it should be acted upon by the person,
f) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity,
g) his reliance on its truth,
h) his right to rely thereon, and
i) his consequent and proximate injury,
noting that the plaintiff must show that each element exists
and the failure to show any one is fatal to recovery.' 7 Taldng
the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, however,
there was still not enough evidence of some of these elements
for the question to go to the jury. Miss Reynolds knew of the
falsity of the agent's statements as she had previously been
notified that she would not have to undergo a physical. Thus,
she could not justifiably rely on Hinson's word that the phys-
ical was necessary. On this point, said the court, the evidence
is susceptible of only one reasonable inference and there it is
a question of law for the court.' 8
In sum, the court said that Miss Reynolds could not be
deceived by that which she knew to be false and remanded
the case.
B. Assault and battery
In Nauful v. Milligan9 the supreme court elaborated on
the old common law doctrine that words alone are never a
provocation for an assault and battery. A neighborhood scuffle
between parties' children resulted in the plaintiff's calling the
defendant's children "white trash." The defendant then called
the plaintiff into the middle of the street where the two en-
gaged in a heated conversation. Plaintiff placed his hands on
defendant's shirt and defendant said, "Hit me," which plain-
tiff proceeded to do. The lower court issued a summary judg-
ment on the liability of the defendant. The supreme court
agreed with the lower court in this respect, citing City of
Gaffney v. Putnam:
2 0
In view of the fact that peace and good order forbid that individuals
shall right their own wrongs, we have announced the rule in numerous
17. Moye v. Wilson Motors, 254 S.C. 471, 176 S.E.2d 147 (1970); Davis
v. Upton, 250 S.C. 288, 157 S.E.2d 567 (1967) ; Jones v. Cooper, 234 S.C. 477,
109 S.E.2d 5 (1959).
18. Tetterton v. Foggie, 253 S.C. 600, 172 S.E.2d 369 (1970).
19. __ S.C. _, 187 S.E.2d 511 (1972).
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cases that in the absence of statute, mere words, no matter how abusive,
insulting, vexatious or threatening they may be, will not justify an
assault and battery, unless accompanied by an actual offer of physical
violence.
2 1
The facts in the case did not show that there was any
threat of physical harm from the plaintiff, thus there was no
provocation on his part, and thus, the defendant could not
use provocation as a defense.
The defendant also claimed that he was engaged in mu-
tual combat with the plaintiff, but the court disagreed saying
for mutual combat to exist a mutual intent and willingness
to fight must be manifested. The testimony showed that de-
fendant initiated the fight so no mutual intent was present.
C. Malicious Prosecution
Cisson v. Pickens Savings and Loan Association 2 dealt
with malicious prosecution. The fact situation which stemmed
chiefly from a previous case23 should be briefly stated. One
McWhorter hired Cisson (a building contractor) to construct
a house which McWhorter financed through a mortgage on
the house with the defendant, Pickens Savings and Loan.
Upon completion of the house, there was a disagreement as
to whether Cisson had been paid in full and he filed a me-
chanic's lien against the property, subsequently bringing a
suit to foreclose on the lien. The defendant with the permission
of the court intervened as a third party, probably to protect
its security interest. The defendant presented the same de-
fense as McWhorter, but was dismissed as a party by the
trial judge. Cisson won a judgment against McWhorter who
did not appeal. The defendant in the present case, however,
did appeal on the grounds that he was wrongfully dismissed
from the suit. The supreme court held he had no right to
appeal.
In an action against the defendant for money claimed
for a mortgage, the plaintiff Cisson also charged the defen-
dant with malicious prosecution for its intervention in the
McWhorter case.2 4 The lower court issued a summary judg-
ment for Pickens Savings and Loan and the plaintiff appealed.
21. Id.
22. 258 S.C. 37, 186 S.E.2d 822 (1972).
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The supreme court agreed with the lower court noting
that for an action to be in malicious prosecution, four ele-
ments must be present:
1) defendant's instituting a judicial proceeding
2) want of probable cause
3) malice in instituting the proceedings
4) resulting injury or damage
Here the plaintiff's sole contention that there was lack of
probable cause for defendant to intervene in the action was
based on fact that the defendant lost at the trial level and
agin in the supreme court. This, the court held, did not show
lack of probable cause. Quoting from Prosser, the court noted,
"it is generally agreed that the termination of the proceeding
in favor of the person against whom it is brought is no evi-
dence that probable cause was lacking, since in a civil action,
there is no preliminary determination of the sufficiency of
the evidence to justify the suit.
' 25
The principle is basic, the court went on, to protect the
"basic right of citizens to sue or defend when sued."
'2 6
In the present case, the defendant did have as an interest
his first mortgage on the property. This was enough justifi-
cation for him to enter suit. Thus, an action for malicious
prosecution could not be sustained since all four of the above
elements could not be demonstrated.
In some very interesting dicta, the supreme court also
stated that an action for malicious prosecution could be sus-
tained for instituting a civil proceeding even where there is
no arrest or intervention with property. This stand is found
in the Restatement of Torts, Section 674.27
III. NEGLIGENCE
Sanders v. Western Auto Supply Company28 involved
negligence in the design of a riding lawnmower. The plaintiff,
a five-year old, while running to jump on the mower with his
father, slipped and fell. As he fell his hand entered the dis-
charge chute of the mower, severely injuring the boy's hand.
The boy, by his father, brought suit against Western Auto
25. Prosser on Torts, (3d) Ed., Section 114, p. 874.
26. 258 S.C. 37, 44, 186 S.E.2d 822, 825.
27. Id.
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Supply Co. as a chain retailer (the mower was sold under its
trade name). The theory that the defendant was responsible
for the manufacturing of the mower was never challenged.
After expert testimony that the mower was not designed
as safely as most other comparable mowers, the jury held
that the defendant was not liable for injuries sustained by
the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed on the grounds that the
instructions he proposed for the jury were erroneously omitted
by the trial judge. The supreme court agreed in part and dis-
agreed in part while reversing and remanding the case.
Sanders first requested a charge paraphrased from
Mickle v. Blackmon , 29 dealing with duty of care of the seller
of a chattel. There was no error in the trial judge rephrasing
this charge, since it only covered simple negligence and this
was covered adequately in the charge the trial judge did use.
However, the plaintiff also requested the following
charge:
Negligence, to render a person liable, need not be the sole cause of
an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence concurring with one or
more efficient causes, is the proximate cause of the injury. So that
where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not
relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them,
it being sufficient that his negligence is an efficient cause, without
which the injury would not have resulted, or to as great an extent.
3 0
This charge was refused by the trial judge on the grounds
that it was inappropriate because there was no negligence
charged except that of the defendant. The supreme court held
this to be in error noting that the defendant alleged as a
defense that the injury was caused solely by the boy running
and falling into the mower. Even though the jury was in-
structed that the plaintiff could recover only upon showing
negligence of defendant and such negligence as the proximate
cause of the injury, that there was no issue as to the father's
negligence and that the child because of his immaturity could
not be charged with negligence, the supreme court found that
a charge on concurrent negligence was necessary. This was
because the jury could have believed, and very probably did
believe, that the conduct of the father and child was a more
direct cause of injury than any defect in design of the mower.
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The charge presented by the plaintiff would have been ade-
quate to guide the jury in its deliberations. 31
The court also held trial judge to be correct in refusing
instructions dealing with breach of warranty in this negli-
gence case. 3
2
A slippery banana peel was the subject of Anderson v.
Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc. 33 The plaintiff while shopping in
defendant's grocery store, stepped on a banana peel left on
the floor and fell injuring herself. In a lower court trial the
jury found for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed claiming
insufficiency of evidence to go to the jury. The supreme court
reversed he lower court decision, with Brailsford, J., writing
the opinion for the majority. Bussey, J. filed a dissenting
opinion.
The court summed up the requirements for negligence
in a case such as this by quoting from several previous cases.
34
It is settled law that a merchant is not an insurer of the safety
of a customer in his store. His duty is to exercise due care to keep
his premises in reasonably safe condition. Proof that a dangerous con-
dition of the floor existed because of the presence of some foreign
matter thereon is insufficient, standing alone, to support a finding of
negligence. Unless it is inferable from the evidence that the store-
keeper was responsible for creating the hazard, knowledge of its exist-
ence, either actual or constructive, is essential to recovery against him.
The defendant will be charged with constructive notice whenever it
appears that the condition has existed for such length of time prior to
the jury that, under existing circumstances, he should have discovered
and remedied it in the exercise of due care; conversely, absent evidence
of such preexistence, the defendant may not be so charged.
3 5
Thus in this case, plaintiff had the burden of proving either
that defendant knew the peel was on the floor or in the exer-
cise of due care should have known that it was on the floor.
The plaintiff attempted to meet this burden by inferences
reasonably drawn from the statement of an employee of the
defendant after the fall to the effect that they (defendant)
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 257 S.C. 75, 184 S.E.2d 77 (1971).
34. Pennington v. Zayre Corp., 252 S.C. 176, 165 S.E.2d 695 (1969);
Wimberly v. Winn-Dixie, 252 S.C. 117, 165 S.E.2d 627 (1969); Gilliland v.
Pierce Motor Co., 235 S.C. 268, 111 S.E.2d 521 (1959) ; Hunter v. Dixie Home
Stores, 232 S.C. 139, 101 S.E.2d 268 (1957).
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should have had the place cleaned up but had not yet "gotten
around to it." This is only evidence dealing with constructive
notice of the defendant.
36
The court held that this statement alone could not create
a reasonable inference that the defendant knew the peel was
there. This reasoning is based on the theory that if the em-
ployee knew the banana peel was there, i.e., if he had discov-
ered it before, "his simple duty to pick it up would have been
exactly the same whether or not, otherwise, the area should
have been cleaned up." 37 The court rather attributed this state-
ment to spur of the moment chagrin and reversed the case
on lack of sufficiency of evidence of defendant's negligence.3"
In Marsh Plywood Corp. v. South Carolina State Highway
Dep't30 the supreme court upheld a lower court decision that
the defendant, appellant, Sotterfield was liable for the loss
of income for cut timber incurred by plaintiff. Sotterfield
Construction Company contracted with South Carolina High-
way Department to build part of 1-95. The work on 1-95 caused
water to back up on land to which plaintiff had a 3 year
timber deed. Plaintiff notified defendant of this condition,
but Sotterfield failed to alleviate the situation. To do so he
would have to build a deam ditch which was already required
by South Carolina Highway Department specifications. (This
ditch was finally built after the timber contract expired.)
Marsh, after the expiration of its contract brought suit against
the defendant for the value of the timber left standing which
it was prevented from cutting due to negligent construction
practices of the defendant. The lower court awarded Marsh
Plywood Corp. this amount. Sotterfield appealed on other
grounds but the supreme court affirmed the decision with
some dicta noting the correctness of the decision below on the
issue of negligence.
Maus v. Pickens Sentinel Co.40 dealt with negligence in
unloading a printing press. The plaintiff had shipped the
press from Tennessee to the defendant in Pickens. The de-
36. Plaintiff also contended that the banana peel was brown and mushy
but the court said this was irrelevant because of the nature of bananas.
37. 257 S.C. 79, 184 S.E.2d 78.
38. Id.
39. 258 S.C. 119, 187 S.E.2d 515 (1972).
40. 258 S.C. 6, 186 S.E.2d 809 (1972).
[Vol. 24
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fendant was engaged by the plaintiff to unload the press and
place it in the office of the purchaser. While this was being
done, the press was dropped to the ground and totally de-
stroyed. Maus charged the defendant with negligence in the
unloading of the press and recovered a lower court judgment
against the defendant for the value of the press.
The defendant appealed to the supreme court on a num-
ber of issues of which only the following deal with tort law.
The court, writing the opinion affirmed the lower court de-
cision.
First, the defendant claimed the court erred in excluding
testimony that the second press sent to the Pickens Sentinel
Company was bolted down more securely than the first. The
court ruled this exclusion was correct, citing Wigmore,41 and
drawing an analogy to the "rule excluding evidence that an
injury-producing object or place was repaired or improved
after the injury was incurred. ' 42
The defendant next contended that the trial judge erred
in charging as follows, when the plaintiff alleged specific
negligence:
I charge you further that when a thing which causes injury or damage
is shown to be under the management or control of another and the
accident in such or in the ordinary course of things does not happen
if the one who possesses the management or control use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absense[sic] of explanation that the
accident arose from the lack of care.4 3
The defendant in his brief charged that the plaintiff, because
of his allegations, had to prove at least one specific act of
negligence. This claim was based on McCready v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co.,44 a case which held that a shipper who
alleges specific acts of negligence must prove negligence and
may not recover on the presumption such as the one presented
in this case. The court said the instruction was not in error
as it only dealt with proof of negligence by circumstantial evi-
dence instead of the burden of proof as between bailor and
bailee or carrier and shipper. However, the court noted, it
41. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §283.
42. 258 S.C. at 12, 186 S.E2d at 911.
43. Id. at 12, 186 S.E.2d at 811, 812.
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was not approving this charge, but only could find no error
as argued by the defendant in this case.
Stating that the trial judge instructed the jury that the
plaintiff need only show simple negligence to recover, the
defendant argued that the jury should also have been in-
structed that simple contributory negligence would be a bar
to plaintiff's recovery. This was held not to be an error, as
the trial judge did adequately instruct the jury on contribu-
tory negligence in general.
The question of sufficiency of evidence was also decided
in the plaintiff's favor as the court said that it would not
review the defendant's appeal on this issue, as when the de-
fendant moved for a directed verdict, he did so only on the
basis of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Thus, not
having raised the issue of sufficiency of evidence at the ap-
propriate trial stage, he could not raise the issue on appeal.
In a per curiam decision the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed a district court decision4 5 dealing with implied
warranties of safety in shipping operations. Thus, in Evans v.
Carolina Shipping Company4" the court upheld the ruling that
when a stevedore knew or there was ample evidence that he
should have known that the customary method of unloading a
ship was being improperly carried on and allowed it to con-
tinue, he breached his implied warranty to unload in safe
conditions. The suit arose when a longshoreman, Norris
Evans, was injured while unloading the SS Pacific Telstar.
Bringing suit against the owner of the ship, Overseas Mari-
time Co., Inc., Norris collected for his injury. In this action
Overseas Maritime with Evans entered a third party suit
against the stevedore which had hired Norris claiming it was
responsible for the injury as it knew of improper unloading
activities and allowed them to continue. The district court
awarded the plaintiff, Overseas, all which it had paid to Norris
on the above theory and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
In still another case dealing with shipping, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Chinese Maritime Trust Ltd. v.
Carolina Shipping Co.47 reversed a district court ruling con-
cerning negligence of a longshoreman. Theodore Horlbeck, a
45. Evans v. Carolina Shipping Co., 330 F. Supp. 654 (1970).
46. 541 F.2d 188 (1971).
47. 456 F.2d 192 (1972).
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longshoreman in the employ of Carolina Shipping Co. was
injured while unloading a ship belonging to Chinese Maritime
Trust, Ltd. The suit was settled without trial, but Chinese
Maritime immediately brought a third party suit for indemni-
fication against warranty of workmanlike performance under
facts similar to Evans v. Carolina Shipping.48 The district
court found that Horlbeck's injuries were due solely to his
own negligence; thus the stevedore did not breach his war-
ranty and Chinese Maritime could not recover.
However, on appeal the court of appeals reversed, citing
United States Lines, Inc. v. Jarka, Corp.,49 for the proposition
that "The contributory negligence of a longshoreman is im-
plied to his employing stevedore and becomes actionable as a
breach of stevedore's warranty of workmanlike performance. 0
Thus, Chinese Maritime was entitled to indemnification since
"no conduct on its part precluded its recovery." 5'
MICHAEL TUCKER COLE
48. 451 F2d 188 (1971).
49. 444 F.2d 26 (4 Cir. 1971).
50. 456 F.2d 192 at 193 (1972).
51. 444 F.2d 26 at 29 cifing Weyerhouser Steamship Co. v. Narcirema
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